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Abstrat
This paper analyzes and improves the reently proposed bins and balls signature (BiBa [23℄),
a new approah for designing signatures from one-way funtions without trapdoors.
We rst onstrut a general framework for signature shemes based on the balls and bins
paradigm and propose several new related signature algorithms. The framework also allows us
to obtain upper bounds on the seurity of suh signatures. Several of our signature algorithms
approah the upper bound. We then show that by hanging the framework in a novel manner we
an boost the eÆieny and seurity of our signature shemes. We all the resulting mehanism
Powerball signatures. Powerball signatures oer greater seurity and eÆieny than previous
signature shemes based on one-way funtions without trapdoors.
Keywords: One-time signature, signature based on one-way funtion without trapdoor, Power-
ball signature.
1 Introdution
Although the speed of high-end proessors ontinues to steadily inrease, we simultaneously witness
the proliferation of low-powered, resoure-starved handheld devies (e.g. ell phone, pager, Palm
pilot). These handheld devies are designed for mobility and onveniene, and their omputation
power is limited by minimal miroproessors and energy resoures.
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Similarly, low powered om-
putation devies have been proposed to build sensor networks for measuring the weather or other
geographially distributed phenomena. We olletively all handheld devies and sensor network
nodes with onstrained omputation and energy resoures small devies. The widespread deploy-
ment of small devies with severe resoure onstraints motivates the need for faster and simpler
signature mehanisms, even though miroproessors ontinue to dramatially inrease in speed. On
these small devies, even the most eÆient asymmetri signature algorithms typially require on
the order of seonds to generate or verify a signature (assuming that the signature ode even ts
into memory). Setion 7 reviews related work in eÆient signature shemes.
Signatures based on one-way funtions without trapdoors (sometimes alled one-time signature
shemes) are an interesting alternative to signatures based on asymmetri ryptography [4, 5, 14,
18, 19, 28℄. One of their main advantages is that these signatures only rely on a one-way funtion,
whih we an implement with a fast hash funtion (e.g. SHA-1 [22℄ or MD5 [29℄), or from a blok
ipher [16, 20, 26, 27℄.
These one-time signature shemes are orders of magnitude faster than traditional signatures, so
they may be an attrative alternative for small devies. However, some of these shemes have large
1
To save prodution osts, manufaturer deploy minimal miroproessors for the required task. Even in the year
2000, 80% of all miroproessors shipped are 4-bit and 8-bit proessors [35℄.
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signatures, and an only sign a xed number of messages per publi key. We review the merits and
drawbaks of one-time signature shemes in Setion 7.
The reently proposed bins and balls (BiBa) signature is a promising new approah to mitigate
some of the drawbaks of one-time signatures [23℄. We review BiBa in Setion 2. In Setion 3
we present an abstrat framework for these types of signatures, whih allows us to present new
approahes in Setion 4 that are more seure. Our framework also allows us to analyze the seurity
of these signature shemes (see Setion 5); we nd that the seurity of the basi BiBa signature as
well as several of our variations is lose to the theoretial bound.
In Setion 6 we extend our abstrat framework and nd an opportunity for a new signature
sheme that improves the seurity of the previous approah (given a ertain signature overhead).
From this framework, we derive the Powerball signature, a new one-time signature sheme with low
overhead and high seurity. We nd that Powerball shemes are viable alternatives for signatures
in small devies.
2 Review of the BiBa Signature
This setion presents a brief review of the BiBa (bins and balls) signature algorithm [23℄. The
set of t seret balls onstitutes the private key PK
 1
= fB
1
: : : B
t
g. The publi key ommits
to all balls in the private key.
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The publi key may be the onatenation of t ommitments
PK = F (B
1
) jj : : : jj F (B
t
) = 
1
jj : : : jj 
t
, or the publi key may be the root of a Merkle hash
tree omputed over the seret balls [17℄. For simpliity of the following desription, we assume that
the publi key is the onatenation of ommitments.
To sign message M , the signer omputes the hash of the message h = H(M) and uses h to
selet a one-way funtion g
h
from a family of hash funtions G (in the random orale model [2℄).
The hash funtion g
h
maps eah ball to one of the n bins. The signature is a olletion of balls
that produe a speial pattern in the bins. A BiBa signature is a olletion of k balls that form a
k-way ollision under g
h
in one bin: hB

1
; : : : ; B

k
i where 
i
is the index in the publi key of the
ith ball in the signature.
To verify the signature hB

1
; : : : ; B

k
i on message M , the verier performs the steps: (1) hek
that all balls of the signature are distint (B

i
6= B

j
for i 6= j); (2) verify the authentiity of the
balls using the publi key (hek that F (B

i
) = 

i
3
); (3) ompute h = H(M) and selet g
h
from
the one-way funtion family; (4) verify the k-way ollision (g
h
(B

1
) = : : : = g
h
(B

k
)).
Note that the probability P
s
that the signer an suessfully sign a message is less than 1. To
deal with this problem, the signer an use a ounter value  as follows. The signer omputes the
hash of the message h = H(M jj ) and uses h to selet the one-way funtion g
h
. If this does not
lead to a suessful signature the signer an inrement the ounter and try again. The signature
is then hB

1
; : : : ; B

k
; i. In this setting we may dene P
s
to be the probability that the signer
an suessfully sign for a given value of . In the original BiBa paper a design goal was to have
P
s
 1=2, so that on average only two values of  need to be tried.
2
A ommitment loks in a seret s without revealing s. We use a one-way and weak ollision resistant funtion F
to ommit to a seret s: the ommitment is  = F (s). To open the ommitment, one publishes s and anybody an
verify that s really orresponds to : ompute F (s) and verify the equality  = F (s).
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In pratie the singer ould help the verier by also sending the indies 
i
; this does not hange the seurity of
the system sine the the forger ould easily hange these unommitted values.
2
k n P
f
k n P
f
2 762460 2
 19:5403
13 192 2
 91:0196
3 15616 2
 27:8615
14 168 2
 96:1001
4 3742 2
 35:6088
15 151 2
 101:3377
5 1690 2
 42:8912
16 136 2
 106:3119
6 994 2
 49:7855
17 123 2
 111:0802
7 672 2
 56:3539
18 112 2
 115:7250
8 494 2
 62:6386
19 104 2
 120:6079
9 384 2
 68:6797
20 96 2
 125:1143
10 310 2
 74:4851
21 89 2
 129:5147
11 260 2
 80:2237
22 83 2
 133:8758
12 222 2
 85:7386
23 78 2
 138:2788
Table 1: The seurity of some BiBa instanes. The signer knows t = 1024 balls and the adversary
has r = k balls. The table shows the probability of forgery P
f
to nd a k-way ollision when
throwing k balls into n bins.
We dene P
f
as the probability that an attaker forges a signature after one attempt. We list
Table 1 from [23℄, whih lists P
f
for dierent BiBa instanes, where in eah ase the number of
bins n is hosen so P
s
 1=2. To ompute the P
f
listed in the table, we assume that the attaker
knows the balls from one dislosed signature, so P
f
=
1
n
k 1
.
3 A generalized setting
We may abstrat the BiBa setting into a ombinatorial balls and bins setting as follows. The signer
has t balls, B
1
; B
2
; : : : ; B
t
, from a universe U
1
. The signer an onstrut funtions g
h
i
, for i =
1; 2; : : :, so that the funtions g
h
i
map balls into bins, where the bins lie in a universe U
2
. We assume
that the funtions g
h
i
look random, so that we model the bin g
h
i
(B
j
) as a bin hosen independently
and uniformly at random from U
2
. A signature onsists of a funtion index i along with a set of k or-
dered pairs of balls and their orresponding bins, f(B

1
; g
h
i
(B

1
)); (B

2
; g
h
i
(B

2
)); : : : ; (B

k
; g
h
i
(B

k
))g.
For a signature to be valid, it must be a member of the set of valid signature patterns P , where
P  (U
1
 U
2
)
k
.
A forger an onstrut funtions g
f
i
, for i = 1; 2; : : :, that also appear to map balls to bins
independently and uniformly at random. The forger, however, does not have aess to all t
balls, but only to balls used by the sender in a sent signature. In the ase where a set of
t balls is only used to onstrut a single valid signature, the forger will only have aess to k
balls; this is the ase we onsider in detail here. The forger reates a suessful signature forgery
f(B

1
; g
f
i
(B

1
)); (B

2
; g
f
i
(B

2
)); : : : ; (B

k
; g
f
i
(B

k
))g if this signature lies in the set of valid signa-
ture patterns P .
In the original BiBa paper, the set of valid signature patterns P onsisted of any set of k balls
that all fell in the same bin. The design goal that the suessful signature probability P
s
be at least
1/2 determines the number of bins n that an be used. While this hoie is somewhat arbitrary, as
we shall see in our analysis in Setion 5, it is useful for omparison purposes and we will adopt it
hereon as well.
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4 Variations
In this setion we onsider other possible shemes based on our general framework. Some of our
examples prove better than the original BiBa sheme in some ases; others are given simply as
instrutional examples of what is possible. The variations listed are by no means exhaustive.
We provide limited numerial results, omparing our sheme against the BiBa sheme for the
range of P
f
values that are interesting for pratial appliations (roughly 2
 70
to 2
 90
).
 The bins orrespond to the range [0; n   1℄ and a valid signature pattern onsists of k balls
that lie in distint bins a
1
; a
2
; : : : a
j
with k
i
balls in bin a
i
. As a spei example, the k balls
ould lie in two distint bins eah with exatly k=2 balls. This is a natural generalization of
the BiBa sheme that performs better for some parameter settings.
For example, let us onsider the ase where a valid signature pattern onsists of k balls with
k=2 balls in eah of two distint bins. The probability the forger sueeds is
 
n
2
 
k
k=2


1
n

k
;
this is easily seen by multiplying the number of ways of hoosing two bins, the number of ways
of splitting the k balls between the bins, and the probability the balls land in the appropriate
bins.
In Table 2 below, we onsider some spei examples where at least x balls are required to
land in eah of y distint bins, so that k = x  y. In all of these simulation results, we hek
that P
s
 1=2 over a series of 1; 000; 000 trials.
4
In all ases using two bins with k=2 balls a
signature performs better than the original BiBa sheme by at least a fator of 2.
k x y n P
f
10 5 2 1308 2
 75:85
12 6 2 796 2
 87:52
14 7 2 551 2
 98:53
12 4 3 2290 2
 87:96
12 3 4 6856 2
 87:57
Table 2: Results when a signature requires throwing k balls into y bins with x balls in eah bin.
 The bins orrespond to the range [0; n   1℄ and a valid signature onsists of k balls falling
in sequential bins modulo n. For the forger, the probability that k balls form a signature
is just (1=n)
k 1
k!; there are n possible starting positions, and for eah starting position the
probability the k balls land in the appropriate k onseutive bins in some order is (1=n)
k
k!.
This sheme appears to perform slightly worse than the original BiBa sheme, as shown in
Table 3, whih is also based on having P
s
 1=2 over 1; 000; 000 trials.
 The balls lie in a universe [0; 2
z
), the bins orrespond to the range [0; n   1℄, and a valid
signature pattern onsists of k balls B

1
< B

2
< : : : < B

k
falling in sequential bins in
order. That is, B

1
falls in the rst bin in the sequene, B

2
in the seond, et. This extends
4
Tehnially, ensuring P
s
 1=2 requires some statistial are; in pratie, we simply tested that if P
s
 1=2, we
were obtaining results at least one standard deviation from the mean. Small variations in n yield minor variations in
P
f
, so we feel our results are aurate enough for demonstrative purposes.
4
k n P
f
10 1489 2
 73:07
11 1318 2
 78:39
12 1188 2
 83:52
13 1087 2
 88:50
Table 3: Results when a signature requires k onseutive non-empty bins.
k n P
f
10 290 2
 73:62
11 241 2
 79:13
12 205 2
 84:47
13 177 2
 89:61
Table 4: Results when a signature requires k onseutive bins with balls in temporal order.
the previous example to inlude a natural temporal ordering on the balls. One might think
the signer would have an advantage in this ase sine the sender an have several balls in a
bin, and therefore the eet of the temporal ordering may be harsher for the forger than the
signer. Note the probability of a forgery is now just (1=n)
k 1
, mathing the original sheme.
This modiation improves over the previous sheme slightly but the resulting numbers are
still not better than BiBa, as shown in Table 4. Again, the results are based on 1; 000; 000
trials.
 The n bins orrespond to
 
v
2

edges on a graph with v verties, and a valid signature pattern
onsists of k edges that form a yle. While this sheme sounds simple, in pratie it would
prove hard to implement. While algorithms for nding k-yles in graphs exist, the best
known general algorithms are exponential in k [1, 39℄. (Sine these are random and fairly
sparse graphs, better algorithms may exist; still, this is a non-trivial problem.) Sine yles
of length 4 are easier to nd, we suggest the following variation.
 The n bins orrespond to
 
v
2

edges on a graph with v verties, and a valid signature pattern
onsists of k = 4k
1
edges that form k
1
vertex-disjoint yles of length 4. Finding yles
of length four an be done using matrix multipliation on the adjaeny graph, and faster
algorithms are known [10℄. This approah still requires signiant omputation for nding a
signature, unlike the original BiBa sheme; however, verifying a signature an still be done
quikly.
We onsider the spei ase of k = 12 and ompute the probability of a suessful forgery.
There are
1
6
 
v
4
 
v 4
4
 
v 8
4

possible ways of hoosing the sets of verties that onstitute the three
yles, and then three ways of orienting the verties within a yle. Hene the probability of
a suessful forgery is
27
6
 
v
4
 
v 4
4
 
v 8
4

12!
 
v
2

12
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In simulations we nd that 936 verties yields P
s
 1=2. We did only simulations of 10,000
trials here, as we used simple matrix multipliation tehniques to hek for yles of length
four. In this ase P
f
= 2
 89:28
. This is more than a fator of eight smaller than for the
original BiBa sheme.
 The balls lie in a universe [0; 2
z
), and the bins orrespond to the range [0; n  1℄ for an even
number n. We assume the balls are thrown in sequential order, aording to a load balaning
sheme as desribed by Voking [37℄. Eah ball has two possible hash loations, one hosen
independently and uniformly at random from the range [0; n=2   1℄ (whih we all the left)
and the other hosen independently and uniformly at random from the range [n=2; n   1℄
(whih we all the right); it is plaed in the bin with fewer balls, with ties being broken in
favor of the smaller numbered bin (toward the left). A signature in this sheme orresponds
to a witness tree, whih proves that a bin with a ertain number of balls exists. For example,
to show that a bin on the left holds three balls, we must not only show the three balls in that
bin, but we must show for the third ball on the left that the orresponding bin on the right
had two balls there previously. Further disussion of the witness trees an be found in [37℄,
and of ourse this approah an be generalized to other similar hashing shemes.
The spei ase of k = 12 orresponds to a witness tree for a bin with three balls on the
left, where there are no repeated balls in the tree. We tested this ase, nding that 1316 bins
allow for P
s
 1=2. The probability of a false positive is somewhat more diÆult to ompute;
we simply note that with these parameters P
f
= 2
 87:68
, whih is almost a fator of 4 better
than the orresponding BiBa sheme.
5 A Unifying Analysis
It should be apparent from our results in the previous setion that many of the shemes we suggest
appear to perform nearly the same. This may seem somewhat unusual, given the variety in the
desriptions of the shemes and the variety in the number of balls neessary to ahieve P
s
 1=2. In
this setion we provide an analysis that explains this behavior. Our analysis yields both an upper
bound on and an approximation for the performane of BiBa shemes and the variations we have
onsidered in Setion 4.
We will say that a bin is overed if a ball lands in the bin. Let us rst onsider any balls and
bins setting where eah suessful signature orresponds to one of N distint patterns, where eah
pattern onsists of a list of k distint bins to be overed.
Theorem 1 In the setting where a valid signature orresponds to one of N distint patterns, where
eah pattern onsists of a list of k distint bins to be overed,
P
s
P
f

t
k
k!
Proof: We rst note that the probability of suess for the forger is P
f
=
Nk!
n
k
. Now onsider the
probability of suess for the signer. As an upper bound (and rough estimate) for the suess of
the signer, we may onsider the expeted number of suessful patterns mathed by the signer. To
6
see this, let p
i
be the probability that the signer mathes at least i patterns, and let X be a random
variable representing the number of patterns mathed. Then
E[X℄ = p
1
+ p
2
+ p
3
+ : : :
Hene E[X℄  p
1
(and in fat E[X℄  p
1
when p
i
is small for i  2).
Now onsider the event that for a spei pattern all k bins are overed. The probability
that any single bin is overed is at most t=n by a union bound. Moreover, for any two bins,
the events orresponding to eah being overed are negatively orrelated. It follows easily that
(t=n)
k
is an upper bound on the probability that all bins in the pattern are overed. Hene
N(t=n)
k
 E[X℄  p
1
= P
s
.
It follows that
P
s
P
f

t
k
k!
, proving the theorem.
Interestingly, this upper bound is independent of the number of bins n and the number of
patterns N .
Looking at the argument more losely, we see that the upper bound should be a fairly good
approximation of the ratio. There is an error introdued beause E[X℄  p
1
, but when p
i
is small
for i  2, this error is not large. Also, in bounding E[X℄ we used a union bound of t=n for the
probability that a bin is overed. In fat the probability that any spei bin remains unovered
(1   1=n)
t
 e
 t=n
. Now if n is large, the events orresponding to bins being overed are nearly
independent. Hene for suÆiently large n, the probability that k bins that onstitute a pattern
are overed is approximately (1   e
 t=n
)
k
. If n is large ompared to t, then this is approximately
(t=n)
k
, the quantity used in the theorem.
Hene we onlude this upper bound is a good approximation when n is large ompared to t
and when p
i
is small for i  2. These properties are approximately true for many of our variations,
explaining their similar performane despite the varying nature of the patterns and the number
of bins required to ahieve a suess probability P
s
 1=2. This argument also explains why the
variations that have more bins generally appear to do better than the original BiBa sheme. The
poorer performane of shemes involving overing several onseutive bins is also laried, as with
these shemes it is lear that p
2
and higher values of p
i
are omparatively large.
While tehnially the above argument assumed that a pattern onsisted solely of a set of bins to
be overed, entirely similar results an be shown to hold for all of the variations we have onsidered.
For example, onsider the original BiBa sheme, in whih a bin is supposed to reeive not just one
but many balls, whih does not appear to t this model. However, onsider the relationship between
an original BiBa sheme with n bins and a modied sheme with ng bins that are grouped into n
groups of size g. If we seek k balls in the same bin for the original BiBa sheme, then our patterns
in the modied sheme will onsist of all sets of k distint bins that all lie in the same group. The
two shemes are nearly equivalent, and hene the performane ratio is essentially the same.
Similarly, requiring the balls to arrive in a spei order does not hange the result. The
probability of suess for the forger drops to to
N
n
k
, sine ordering variations no longer help the
forger. But there is a orresponding drop in the bound for P
s
by a 1=k! fator, sine the sender
must also ahieve a spei ordering on the balls.
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6 The Powerball Signature
This setion introdues the Powerball signature, our improvement on the BiBa signature. Our new
signature is based on the following observation. The original BiBa sheme has a xed number of
known signature patterns, i.e., a ollision of k balls in one bin is a valid signature pattern. In BiBa,
these patterns are impliit; all the partiipants agree on them. In our new approah, the signature
patterns are expliit. In the same way the signer ommits to t balls in the publi key, the signer
also ommits to t
0
patterns P
i
(1  i  t
0
). Eah pattern speies k bins, so P
i
= hb
1
; : : : ; b
k
i.
As in BiBa, to sign message M , the signer omputes the hash of the message h = H(M jj ) (
is a ounter that the sender inrements if it didn't nd a signature) and uses h to selet a one-way
funtion g
h
from a family of hash funtions G (in the random orale model [2℄). The hash funtion
g
h
maps eah ball to one of the n bins. To nd a valid signature, the signer searhes for a omplete
pattern P
i
, where every bin in the pattern ontains a ball. (If a bin appears  times in the pattern,
the orresponding bin ontains at least  balls.) If the signer nds a omplete pattern P
i
, it reates
the signature hB

1
; : : : ; B

k
; P
i
; i (where 
j
are the indies of the balls that landed in the bins of
pattern P
i
).
To verify the signature hB

1
; : : : ; B

k
; P
i
; i on message M , the verier performs the steps: (1)
hek that all balls of the signature are distint (B

i
6= B

j
for i 6= j); (2) verify the authentiity of
the balls using the publi key (hek that the ommitment F (B

i
) is in the publi key); (3) verify
the authentiity of the pattern P
i
using the publi key (hek that the ommitment F (P
i
) is in the
publi key); (4) ompute h = H(M jj ) and selet g
h
from the one-way funtion family; (5) verify
that the k balls over all k bins of pattern P
i
= hb
1
; : : : ; b
k
i, so g
h
(B

1
) = b
1
; : : : ; g
h
(B

k
) = b
k
.
Let us onsider the ratio of suess between the sender and the forger in this model. The forger
knows k balls and a pattern. Reall that in the standard sheme with k + 1 balls sent, we found
an upper bound on this ratio
t
k+1
(k+1)!
. The probability of suess for the forger in our new sheme is
P
f
=
k!
n
k
.
For the signer, we approximate the expeted number of mathed patterns, whih in turn ap-
proximates P
s
. For simpliity we assume that the signer has t
0
= t possible patterns; we further
assume that the system is arranged so that these patterns are distint. As before, the probability
that eah is overed is upper bounded by (t=n)
k
; this is a good approximation if n is muh larger
than t. Hene our approximation for P
s
is t
k+1
=n
k
, and hene the ratio between the sender and
forger is
t
k+1
k!
. Our new sheme therefore hanges the bound of Theorem 1, doing better by a fator
of k + 1.
Adding t
0
= t ommitments of the patterns to the publi key would double its size, a rather
severe additional ost. We introdue a method to add the patterns to the publi key without
inreasing its size. Imagine that the ball is the ommitment of the pattern, so a ommitment
in the publi key ommits to both the ball and the pattern. We all this struture a Powerball.
For a Powerball, we begin with a bit string that represents a pattern P
i
. (For now we assume a
simple mapping from bit strings to patterns.) The ball B
i
is derived from the pattern P
i
using the
one-way funtion F : B
i
= F (P
i
). The ommitment C
i
is then a further appliation of F on B
i
:
C
i
= F (B
i
) = F (F (P
i
)). This requires the additional assumption that F is not only one-way, but
that as a funtion it appears random, so that we may assume the balls are distributed independently
and uniformly at random. Hash funtions in the random orale model have this property [2℄.
Note that the forger an obtain a (k + 1)st ball from P
i
by omputing B
i
= F (P
i
). We solve
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k n P
f
9 1734 2
 78:37
10 1548 2
 84:17
11 1407 2
 89:79
12 1295 2
 95:23
13 1204 2
 100:50
Table 5: Results with the Powerball sheme when a signature pattern uses k bins, and therefore
k + 1 Powerball are used.
this problem by requiring that the ball B
i
does not our as a ball in the signature. If the forger
does not have another pattern, it annot use B
i
beause it has to use the only pattern it knows.
Results from simulations of the Powerball sheme are presented in Table 6. Comparing with
Table 1, we see that the Powerball sheme does improve performane, as the theoretial framework
suggests. A Powerball is worth almost another ball; that is, using k + 1 = 11 Powerballs is almost
as good as requiring 12 balls to fall into a bin using the original BiBa sheme.
We an slightly enhane the advantage for the signer by further hanging the meaning of a
Powerball. For example, suppose we require that two Powerballs must be ombined in some order
to represent a pattern. For example, we may take the exlusive-or of bits in the P
i
in order to
obtain a pattern. In this ase we use k + 2 Powerballs to represent a signature; k orrespond to
balls, and two orrespond to a pattern. In this ase we still have P
f
=
k!
n
k
. On the other hand, for
the signer we have E[X℄ 
t
k+2
2n
k
. Note the introdution of the fator of two in the denominator,
sine there are
 
t
2

possible patterns for the signer. Hene the upper bound on the ratio P
s
=P
f
is
about t
k+2
=2k!. This is a fator
 
k
2

better than the sheme without Powerballs. Again, there are
tradeos to using suh mehanisms, inluding the diÆulty for the signer to nd a mathed pattern,
so these Powerball variations may be of theoretial interest only. However, this demonstrates how
small hanges in the model an lead to dierent analyses.
A similar idea an be used to redue the size of the publi key, whih is very large in the standard
BiBa sheme. Suppose we require that two Powerballs be ombined, say via an exlusive-or, in
order to onstrut a ball. In this ase, a sender with t Powerballs has roughly
 
t
2

balls to play with;
this number is not exat beause we restrit eah pair of Powerballs to be disjoint. Now a forger
with k non-pattern Powerballs has (k   1)  (k   3)  : : : 3  1 ways of pairing up the k Powerballs
into k=2 atual balls. Hene at the ost of inreasing the power of the forger somewhat (by giving
the forger more than one set of balls to use), we an dramatially redue the size of the publi key.
Whether this tradeo is useful may depend on the desired system parameters.
7 Related Work
We rst review related work in eÆient asymmetri signatures targeted towards resoure-onstrained
devies. We then review researh related to signatures based on one-way funtions without trap-
doors. We also point out that the idea of using the asymmetry between signers and forgers in balls
and bins senarios has been used in other situations, suh as the MiroMint payment sheme [30℄.
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EÆient Signature Algorithms for Resoure-onstrained Devies
Previous studies show that omputing asymmetri ryptographi operations (e.g. omputing an
RSA signature [31℄, or a DiÆe-Hellman key agreement [9℄) takes on the order of seonds and
sometimes even minutes on some handheld devies. Brown et al. analyze the omputation time of
various digital signature algorithms on various platforms [7℄: Ellipti Curve Cryptography (ECC)
signature algorithms require 1:0{2:2 seonds for one signature generation, and 1:8{5:3 seonds for
veriation (on a Palm Pilot or RIM pager). On the same arhiteture, a 512-bit RSA signature
requires 2:4{5:7 seonds for generation, and 0:1{0:6 seonds for veriation (depending on the publi
exponent). The problem of performing ryptographi operations on minimal hardware is even more
pronouned on some sensor networks. For example, futuristi Smart Dust sensors present even more
stringent resoure onstraints [13, 38℄.
To speed up the slow signature generation, Even, Goldreih, and Miali propose on-line / o-line
signatures [11℄. The slow signing operation is performed o-line, and the signer has subsequently a
low overhead to generate the nal signature. They propose to use a traditional signature algorithm
to sign the publi key of a one-time signature algorithm o-line. The on-line signature with the
one-time signature algorithm is very eÆient.
Shnorr proposes a signature algorithm that allows the signer to perform most of the work
o-line and the remaining on-line work is eÆient [33℄. Shamir and Tauman propose a signature
based on hameleon hashing whih allows o-line preomputation and eÆient on-line signing [34℄.
Other researhers propose to use omputationally more powerful third parties to o-load some
of the expensive operations. For example, Modadugu, Boneh, and Kim propose to use an untrusted
third party to speed up RSA key generation on a small devie [21℄.
Smart ards also attrated attention for eÆient signature algorithms. Poupard and Stern
design signature algorithms eÆient on smart ards [24, 25℄. Courtois, Goubin, and Patarin also
design new signature algorithms eÆient for smart ards [8℄. Lenstra and Verheul propose an
eÆient signature based on XTR, whih provides short signatures [15℄. Hostein, Pipher, and
Silverman propose NSS, an eÆient NTRU lattie-based signature algorithm [12℄. To the best of
our knowledge, the signature veriation times of all of these algorithms are still slower than RSA.
Signatures based on One-way Funtions without Trapdoors
Signatures based on one-way funtions without trapdoors are sometimes also alled one-time sig-
natures.
Rabin published the rst one-time signature based on a symmetri enryption funtion [28℄.
The signature requires interation between the signer and the verier, and the publi key and
signature are on the order of 1 Kbyte.
Lamport shows how to onstrut a digital signature out of a one-way funtion [14℄. His approah
does not require interation between the signer and verier, however, the size of the validation
parameters and signature are still on the order of 1 Kbyte. Lamport's basi approah is that the
signer publishes two ommitments for eah bit (for 0 and 1, respetively) of the data to sign. To
sign the message, the signer reveals one of the values previously ommitted to, based on whether
the orresponding message bit was 0 or 1.
Merkle and Winternitz improved on Lamport's signature [18, 19℄. Even, Goldreih, and Miali
[11℄ use the Merkle-Winternitz approah to onstrut their on-line / o-line signature. Rohatgi
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Signature Generation Veriation Signature size Publi key size
O-line On-line (expeted)
Lamport 160 1 80 80 160
Merkle-Winternitz 355 1 169 23 1
Bleihenbaher-Maurer 182 1 72 45 1
BiBa 1024 2048 23 11 1024
Powerball 2048 2048 20 10 1024
Table 6: Comparison of one-time signature algorithms. The table onsiders a signature of an 80-bit
hash. For the Merkle-Winternitz signature, we use the parameters that Rohatgi proposes to sign
80 bits [32℄.
further renes Merkle andWinternitz's approah and proposes k-times signatures [32℄, whih feature
a small publi key and allow signing k messages. The main drawbak of this approah is the large
signature size, whih is around 300 bytes per signature (for a 6-times key), whih is more than twie
the size of the equivalent BiBa signature. Furthermore, the signer omputes 350 o-line one-way
funtion appliations per signature, and the verier omputes 184 one-way funtions on average to
verify the signature.
Bleihenbaher and Maurer analyzed signature algorithms with a minimal number of nodes in
the graph [5, 4, 3℄.
Table 6 ompares the various one-time signature algorithms. We onsider the omputation and
ommuniation overhead as a basis for omparison. We hoose the signature parameters suh that
a forger has a probability of 2
 80
to nd a valid signature after one try. For the omputation
overhead, we onsider the number of one-way funtion omputations the signer needs to perform to
ompute the publi key (o-line), and the expeted number of one-way funtion omputations the
signer performs to atually generate the signature (on-line). For the veriation overhead we list
the expeted number of one-way funtion omputations the verier performs to hek the signature.
For the omputation overhead, we onsider the size of the publi key, and the size of a signature.
We express the signature and publi key size in number of nodes. In pratie, eah node may be
on the order of 96{128 bits long.
8 Disussion and Conlusion
To the best of our knowledge, the Powerball signature is the fastest signature for veriation.
To ahieve a probability of forgery of P
f
 2
 80
, the verier only needs to ompute 20 one-way
funtions. This veriation ost dereases further if we inrease the number of balls of the signer.
In the most extreme ase, the signature only ontains a single ball, and the verier only omputes
two hash funtions to verify the signature.
The Powerball signature also features shorter signatures than previous one-time signature al-
gorithms. These improvements ome at the ost of a larger publi key and a higher signature
generation overhead. However, the signature generation in Powerball is highly parallelizable |
with enough proessors Powerball only requires two sequential hash funtion omputations.
Other features of Powerball inlude the small ode size (as we an implement it based on
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a blok ipher), that the seurity does not rely on any unproven number-theoreti assumptions
(the signature remains seure even if a fast fatoring algorithm is invented), and the fat that
the signature algorithm annot be used as an enryption algorithm (advantage for ertain export
restritions).
The Powerball signature has many appliations. For example, the fast signature generation
(with parallel proessors) and super-fast veriation may be useful in stok trading systems that
require non-repudiation and the lowest possible end-to-end delay.
Another appliation is in small devies that take seonds to generate or verify a traditional asym-
metri digital signature. Some embedded 8 bit miroproessors even lak a built-in multipliation
instrution. Thus, many traditional signature algorithms are ineÆient on suh devies. Fortu-
nately, many eÆient blok iphers exist for these arhitetures, and we an implement Powerball
based on a single blok ipher enryption funtion.
The Powerball signature may also solve another hard problem. Many appliations that rely
on digital signatures are suseptible to a denial-of-servie (DoS) attak: an attaker oods the
vitim with a large number of bogus signatures. Beause signature veriation is generally a slow
operation (a 1024-bit RSA verify takes on the order of 0:5 milliseond on a 800 MHz Pentium II
proessor), the vitim is omputationally overwhelmed just heking all signatures. Powerball has
a nie property: even if a forger an nd a signature where k   1 balls land in the orret bin, a
verier that heks the balls of the signature in random order disovers the bad ball after heking
after heking an average of (k + 1)=2 balls. In pratie, the forger an nd even fewer mathing
balls, so the verier an detet an invalid signature after a few hash funtion omputations. The
Powerball sheme is thus ideal to defend against these DoS attaks.
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